Abstract. One-year-ahead forecasts by the OECD and by national institutes of GDP growth and inflation in 13 European countries are analysed. RMSE was large: 1.9 % for growth and 1.6 % for inflation. Six (11) OECD and 10 (7) institute growth forecast records were significantly better than an average growth forecast (the current year forecast). All full record-length inflation forecasts were significantly better than both naive alternatives. There was no significant difference in accuracy between the forecasts of the OECD and the institutes. Two forecasts were found to be biased and one had autocorrelated errors. Directional forecasts were significantly better than a naive alternative in one-half of the cases. Overall, inflation forecasts were significantly more accurate than growth forecasts, and in contrast to growth forecasts, they generally improved over time. This has implications for economic policy. Positively biased revisions reveal large errors in data.
Introduction 1
Macroeconomic forecasts attract the interest of the general public, for obvious reasons, but only as long as they refer to the future. Few care about old forecasts of events in the past. But if we do not know the past record of a forecaster, how are we to judge his/her last statement about the future? It should be the responsibility of all serious forecasters to regularly publish reports with an analysis of their forecast records using adequate statistical methods. Granger (1996) suggests that point forecasts should be supplemented by confidence intervals, based on past performance.
The forecasts of large international organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD, and of some national forecasting institutes are occasionally scrutinised, cf. Artis (1996) , Ash et al. (1998), Mills and Pepper (1999) and McNees (1992) for some of the most recent reports. This study compares the accuracy of real annual output growth and inflation forecasts made by the OECD for 13 European countries and forecasts made by an institute in the country studied 2 .
The first hazard one encounters is becoming lost in dimensionality. There are many forecasters, and each forecasts many variables for several horizons. Different periods can be studied, there is a multitude of ways to assess accuracy, compare forecasters, etc. In order to keep the analysis manageable, we will study just two variables: growth, as measured by the annual percentage change in GDP, and inflation, measured by the annual percentage change in the consumption deflator. The horizon is one year ahead.
The next obstacle involves the very definition of accuracy. Assessing the accuracy of a forecast ex post may seem to be a simple problem: one just measures the distance between the forecast and the "known" outcome. But in forecasting GDP, the outcome is not known in the sense of aiming a 1 Two earlier reports from this study are Öller & Barot (1998 Öller & Barot ( , 1999 . 3 weapon at an immobile target. All national statistical offices first publish a preliminary figure, which can best be described as an informed guess, i.e. it is also a forecast. Successive revisions, some many years later, will reduce the share of approximation in the figure, but they never eliminate it completely. Hence, comparing forecasters according to how close they come to a published figure is also a comparison of the "outcome" data. McNees (1989) describes forecasting and revising as a continuous process that starts long before the period concerned, and continues long after.
In Ash et al. (1998) 3 , forecasts made by the OECD of G7 countries and 20 macroeconomic variables are studied and tested, using forecast records from the period 1967-1987, and three forecast horizons: ½, 1 and 1 ½ years ahead. Taking ordinary differences of seasonally adjusted GDP, their main result is that what they call "quasi-forecasts", i.e. forecasts for the current half-year, generally are useful, in the directional sense. When the horizon is extended to one year ahead, there still is some indication that growth forecasts are valuable to users, but only in the case of France, the UK and the US. When the horizon is 1½ years, only the UK forecast is better than a naive alternative. Stekler (1994) analyses three organisations that have forecasted quarterly GNP for the United States for the period [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] . Direction and rough size of change are studied. Again, the main conclusion is that current quarter quasi-forecasts are useful, while the results for one-quarterahead forecasts are ambiguous. Note that our comparison will use annual figures.
The data are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we look at root mean squared errors (RMSE) and we test for improvement on two naive alternatives using the Wilcoxon signed rank test of Diebold and Mariano (1995) . In choosing a naive alternative, we have endeavoured to reconstruct the situation in which the forecast was made. Hence, if the naive alternative is the average growth or the previous value of the series, we have only used data that were available to the forecaster.
Consequently, the current year figure will be the forecast made in the autumn of the same year. We also test for accuracy improvement over time. A t-test is used to determine if inflation forecasts are 4 significantly more accurate than growth forecasts. Weak form informational efficiency, i.e. bias and/or autocorrelation, is studied in Section 4. Non-parametric measures of accuracy based on direction allow for a different assessment. In Section 5 we look at acceleration/deceleration and test against a naive variant using a standard contingency table. In Section 6 we take a brief look at revisions and Section 7 summarises and discusses the results.
Data 4
OECD annual growth and inflation forecasts have been collected from the December issue of the Economic Outlook, 1971 . When these forecasts were made, preliminary data for the first half of the current year were the latest data available. Inflation forecasts have smaller errors and the falling tendency has been captured quite well by the forecasters.
OECD
[Exhibit 1 here]
Outcome (for both the OECD and institutes) is defined as the figure published in the December issue of the Economic Outlook one year later. This is probably the figure most forecasters are aiming for, because it is sufficiently near the time when the forecast was made to be regarded as relevant to the debate 7 .
Root mean squared errors and naive forecasts
The most common average error measure, RMSE, is shown in Exhibit 2a for growth and Exhibit 2b for inflation. Panel A contains the country forecasts of the OECD and Panel B shows those from the national institutes. We treat the growth forecasts first. For the entire period 1971-1997, the RMSE is in the range of 1.3 % for the OECD's forecast of growth in France, and 2.6 % for both forecasts for Finland. Even the minimum is above one percentage point, which must be considered unacceptably large. Still, they are of the same order as reported in other studies, see e.g. Zarnowitz (1992) for the US as well as Artis (1996) for the G7 countries; but the errors are smaller than for more volatile quarterly growth forecasts, cf. e.g. McNees (1986 The naive trend growth would be the best possible forecast for change in a variable y t , if it would be close to a random walk with drift, and if nothing else would be known about y t than its own history. A random walk with drift can be written:
where ∆ is percentage growth, µ > 0 is average (percentage) change and the errors a t are i.i.d.
(0,σ 2 ). For testing if the forecasts are more accurate than what can be generated by (1), µ must be estimated recursively as a time varying mean. 7 The naive "latest change" would be optimal if y t would be close to a random walk in percentage changes:
When testing against (2), we project the autumn growth forecast for the current year one year ahead.
In Exhibit 2a both growth forecasts for Norway have RMSE/SD ratios above unity for the period 1971-97. A possible explanation is the unpredictability of the offshore economy of Norway 11 . In Exhibit 2b we find ratios above unity only for the last period for both forecasts for Ireland and for the one by FPB.
As in McNees (1978) we have tested published forecasts against naive alternatives, pooling all forecasts as if the same person had made them all. The null hypotheses of no better accuracy were rejected (last row), both using the binomial test suggested in ibid. and when applying the DM test.
Note that we study one-year-ahead forecasts, calculated as annual growth rates, not as successive differences of semi-annual or quarterly figures as in Ash et al. (1998) and Stekler (1994) , where forecasts quickly lost their accuracy. Using the DM test, we also checked if there is a difference in accuracy between the OECD and national institutes, but we found no significant difference.
The DM test shows that 6 OECD growth forecasts (Exhibit 2a) were significantly more accurate than projections of the average growth one year ahead. All but the OECD forecasts for growth in Norway and Switzerland were better than the naive alternative "current year forecast". For the national institutes, the corresponding numbers were 10 and 7. Note that some tests are based on fewer observations, because of lack of historical data from some institutes. All inflation forecasts with full length records were significantly better than both naive alternatives.
We did not expect that so many forecasters would prove better than naive projections, given the relatively large forecast errors. In Öller & Barot (1999) we used growth outcomes for the current year as naive alternatives. As correctly pointed out by the referees, this makes the comparison 8 unfairly difficult for the forecasters, since they did not know the outcome for the current year when they made their forecasts for the next year. Indeed, by that comparison, only a few forecasters would have been significantly better than the naive alternative.
Could the two time series be regarded as random walks, generated by (1)? We tested to see if mean growth deviations could be regarded as white noise applying a Breusch-Godfrey LM-test. A triangle after the country name in Panel A of Exhibits 2a and 2b marks where this hypothesis could be rejected (we used longer data series, where available). In Exhibit 2a (growth) we see that the hypothesis could be rejected for all but five countries, and in Exhibit 2b (inflation), it is rejected for all countries. Hence, using (1) as a forecasting model, it should not have been difficult to dominate.
For the shorter periods (1980-97 and 1985-97) , tests were made only in cases where no data were available from the beginning of the period.
The figures under the totals show the results when the forecasts are compared to the final outcome. In most cases forecasts are closer to the figures released in December the following year than to the final value 12 . However, the overall message of Exhibit 2 remains unchanged, so we decided not to report these results. Also, note the arbitrariness of the concept "final". The point in time when a figure is "final" may vary from country to country. Furthermore, all figures from the 1990s may still be revised.
Comparing Exhibits 2a and 2b, one immediately notices the much smaller RMSE and RMSE/SD for inflation than for growth; the inflation ratio is only one-half the size of that for growth forecasts. This is an interesting result from the policy viewpoint, and one would like to test to see if the difference in accuracy is statistically significant. The number of error observations being 647 and 568 for growth and inflation, respectively, we used an asymptotic t-test 13 for the null hypothesis that RMSE/SD is 9 the same for growth and inflation. A t-value of 9.4 shows that the difference in accuracy hardly can be regarded as a result of pure chance.
The Mean Absolute Errors (MAE) were calculated, but are not reported here. The error distributions were found to be close to normal, in which case a rule of thumb is that RMSE ≅ 1.25MAE, see Granger (1996) , and hence MAE does not contain much additional information.
Has the development of forecasting methods during a quarter of a century resulted in improved forecast accuracy? Looking at aggregate RMSE/SD at the bottom rows of Exhibits 2a and 2b, we find that there is little change (for the better). Treating the country/institute observed errors as a random sample, the absolute errors made by each forecaster were regressed against a constant and a time trend 14 . Only the OECD growth forecasts for Italy and Sweden improved significantly over time. We may note in passing that Kennedy (1969) reports the following characteristics of the NIESR forecasts of growth 1959-1967: RMSE = 1.4, SD = 1.8 so that RMSE/SD = 0.8, which is the same figure as in Exhibit 2a.
Testing for improvement over time in inflation forecasts showed that all had improved significantly, except the OECD forecasts for the Netherlands and Norway and those by IFO and CPB. Not only are inflation forecasts more accurate than the growth forecasts, they also improve over time, but only in absolute terms, not in relation to SD.
Weak form informational efficiency
If one finds that a forecaster has a tendency to over-estimate or under-estimate the outcome, this is a systematic error (bias) that could easily be corrected, making the forecast more accurate. There is also another type of systematic error. If over-estimating is more likely to be followed by another forecast above the target, and the same tendency applies to under-estimating, then the forecaster is rigid and this shows up as autocorrelated one-step-ahead forecast errors. If autocorrelation is known to exist it is systematic and could be taken into account before releasing the final forecast. The absence of bias in one-step-ahead forecasts and no autocorrelation in forecast errors is called "weak form informational efficiency". This is regarded as rational forecasting in the limited sense of McNees (1978) . The limitations are that:
The forecaster's error loss function must be symmetric. As noted in Section 2, a higher penalty for negative errors makes it perfectly rational to make forecasts that are positively biased, cf. Clements and Hendry (1998) and Zellner (1986) , and
(ii) In case of a symmetric loss function, unbiasedness and absence of autocorrelation are only necessary conditions for rationality. If information that could have reduced RMSE was available, but not utilised, the forecast is irrational.
In short, forecast errors should be innovations towards all available information. This will not be tested here, and we avoid the term "rational".
[
Exhibit 3]
The conventional test method for bias in forecasts goes back at least to Theil (1966) . The actuals are linearly regressed on the forecasts and a constant. The null hypothesis is that the regression coefficient is 1 and the constant is 0. The problem with this test is that the residuals will often be positively autocorrelated, thus inflating (biasing) the test of the null hypothesis. Autocorrelation is a measure of the rigidity of forecasters and should thus be included in the same test as pointed out by many authors. Instead of applying a Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation (McNees, 1978) , or postulating an error-process as in Brown and Maital (1981) 15 , we suggest testing both types of systematic errors simultaneously by regressing the forecast error on a constant and as many lagged errors as necessary to whiten the residuals: OECD's forecasts of growth for Norway is inefficient according to the LR test.
Other researchers, e.g. Diebold et al. (1997) have found a tendency to under-estimate inflation during episodes of high inflation and to over-estimate it in periods of low inflation. This tendency should produce autocorrelation. If the tendency exists in European data, with one exception it is not sufficiently strong to trigger significance in tests of autocorrelation. We will return to this question in the next section.
Nothing has been said of heteroscedasticity in errors yet. Indeed, nearly all inflation forecast errors appear to decrease over time (see Exhibit 1b), which is a sign of heteroscedasticity. Regressing outcomes on forecasts, the positive correlation between forecasts and errors will inflate the t-values.
We performed ARCH tests, which produced significance only in cases where the test for bias did not signal significance, so that the inference from Exhibit 3 does not change. 5 Directional forecasts Leitch and Tanner (1995) Beginning with the growth forecasts, we see from Exhibit 1a that there have been three major recessions in the period studied: (1) the mid-1970s, (2) the early 1980s 16 , and (3) the early 1990s.
Did the forecasters issue correctly timed signals? The sad answer is, only in rare cases. IFO saw the first recession coming, but its severity was greatly under-estimated so the warning was of doubtful quality. IFO gave a perfect recession alert for the third recession. The OECD issued an almost correctly timed warning for recession (1) in Italy and a perfect one for recession (2) [1976] [1977] . The outcome was a deceleration from 1.4 % to -2.4 %. 16 The first two are discussed in Wallis (1989) . Except for two observations, annual inflation has been positive in all countries considered and growth has almost always been positive. Thus, calculating the number of times that the sign has been correctly forecasted does not make sense for inflation, and for growth there are so few observations that we have chosen to comment on them verbally above. We found the following solution to this problem. At the end of the year, both the OECD and the institutes publish forecasts for the following as well as for the current year. This means that the forecasts signal if there will be an acceleration or a deceleration of production/inflation. We study this second order direction, which is done for prices in Ash et al. (1998) .
Exhibit 4a shows the years when the forecasters missed the change in growth. The OECD's forecasts for growth in the UK have missed only four times (1975, 1977, 1981 and 1996) during the 27-year period studied. Among the institutes, only MIFF has equally few misses. IFO fares much worse in this comparison than when the criterion RMSE/SD is used. In order to compare with a naive alternative, the last column contains ratios of forecast misses to the number of misses that would have occurred with a simple projection of the last acceleration/deceleration one-year-ahead. Again, we used the forecast of the current year and the autumn statistics for the previous year's outcome, to place ourselves into the position of the forecaster. In an analogy with the Theil Index, it can be said that if the ratio is not below unity, the direction was not predicted better than by a naive forecast.
There are eight ratios at or above unity, if sub-periods are also considered: the OECD forecast for Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway as well as those made by DEC, CPB 17 , MIFN and KOF.
For ratios below unity, we have performed a simple contingency table test, see Appendix B. An asterisk in the last column of Exhibit 4a shows where growth forecasts are significantly corralated with the outcome, which is in only one-half of the cases. This contradicts the claim in Leitch and Tanner (1995) that macroeconomic forecasters may be better at direction than at numerical accuracy. 14 When we tested the pooled data, the accuracy as a whole was significantly better than a naive projection.
Acceleration/deceleration forecasts of inflation are shown in Exhibit 4b. Twelve out of 26 of the forecasts are not significantly more correct than the naive alternative, which is almost the same number as for growth forecasts. According to this criterion directional growth and inflation forecasts appear to be equally accurate, but note that overall, the latter are wrong much less often than the former (24 % vs. 29 % for growth). Now both forecasts for the UK and the OECD forecast for Norwegian inflation miss only twice.
The OECD directional inflation forecasts for the Nordic countries, except for Norway, stand out as being particularly poor. The naive alternative (same acc./dec. as the year before) would have missed only three accelerations/decelerations of inflation in Finland, while the OECD emitted wrong signals in 10 cases! The naive variant would have proven better than DEC by 8 -6 and NIER by 8 -7. These forecasters may have had a cost function in mind, where wrongly predicting accelerating inflation carries a much higher penalty than wrongly predicting decelerating inflation. Considering that these countries had highly centralised labour markets with strong government involvement in this period, forecasters close to government would have an incentive to issue forecasts of decelerating inflation so as to ward off too high wage claims. Indeed, comparing over-predictions and under-predictions, one gets the following scores: OECD: Finland 10 -0, DEC 6 -2 and NIER 8 -1.
Could acceleration/deceleration be particularly difficult to forecast for certain years? Exhibit 5 presents aggregated OECD and national institute directional forecast misses over time. The year 1988 stands out as the most difficult for forecasting growth. It is not difficult to guess why ; in October 1987, too many forecasters still believed in positive and unavoidable correlation between the stock market and production. More surprising is the contrast between the years 1994 and 1995. Here it is difficult to find the reason. Again, inflation forecast misses behave quite differently; there is no exceptionally bad year.
[Exhibit 5 here]
6 Statistical errors 18 To understand why errors are so large, we refer to what was said in the introduction about measuring forecast errors as the difference between the forecast and a preliminary figure. Despite the importance of GDP and the consumption deflator as indicators, their measurement is uncertain. In Exhibit 6 we have calculated the root mean squared revision (RMSR). This is a measure of the errors detected in the official statistics, as of December, after one revision has already been made. The error measure is biased downwards also because the last observations will be further revised. Moreover, there are all kinds of errors, e.g. from sampling. Assume that two thirds are detected and removed.
Then the average statistical error would be only slightly smaller than the average RMSE (1.9) of growth forecasts and 40 % of inflation RMSE (1.6). This simple calculation shows that forecasters may be able to share the blame for bad forecasts with the statistical authorities 19 . Exhibit 6 also reveals that some revisions are significantly biased. As already noted by Denton and Oksanen (1972) , preliminary figures underestimate.
[Exhibit 6]
A rational forecaster dealing with uncertain data avoids big shifts in forecasts; he/she is rigid in the sense discussed in Section 4, inducing positive autocorrelation. There was very little evidence of autocorrelation in Exhibit 3, which means that forecasters were quite efficient when dealing with uncertain data, compensating for the negative autocorrelation that would appear in the forecasts if they would accept their model (real or intuitive) forecasts based on revised data, but using preliminary data as the starting point 20 .
Conclusion and discussion
In summary, we have found that:
(1) Average errors in forecasts of both growth and inflation are large, in terms of both their variance and the importance of these variables. European macroeconomic forecasts for the following year, of both growth and inflation are as a whole (pooled) significantly more accurate than two naive alternatives. Significant superiority was also found for directional (acceleration/deceleration) forecasts. However, we found no significant difference in accuracy between the OECD and institute forecasts.
(2) Accuracy, as measured by RMSE is significantly higher for inflation than for growth forecasts.
There are fewer directional misses in inflation forecasts than in growth forecasts.
(3) The following individual forecasts of growth (full-length records) are significantly better than all naive alternatives tested here: average growth, latest growth and random growth direction: the OECD forecasts for France, UK, Austria 21 and Sweden, and among the institutes, NIESR, MIFF and NIER. The following growth forecasts were found not to be useful according to any criterion: the OECD forecast for Norway, and the institute forecasts of MIFN and KOF.
(4) According to RMSE/SD, all inflation forecasts with full-length record were better than both naive alternatives. The OECD forecasts for the UK and France again fare best in the competition, whereas some forecasters had their rankings reversed in comparison with growth forecasts (e.g. the forecasts for Norway). One-half of the directional inflation forecasts were significantly better than the naive alternative.
20 See Clements & Hendry (1988), Ch. 8.3. 21 For Austrian macroeconomic forecasts, see Thury (1986) . (5) The only growth forecasts that had improved over time were those of the OECD for Italy and Sweden. The only inflation forecasts that did not improve over time were the OECD forecasts for the Netherlands and Norway and those made by IFO and CPB. The improvement was in absolute terms, not in relation to the standard deviation.
(6) Weak form informational efficiency was rejected in very few cases 22 .
(7) We found no support in annual data for the claim in Leitch and Tanner (1995) that macroeconomic directional forecasts are more accurate than forecasts measured on an interval scale, and turning points had generally been missed.
(8) Accuracy appears to be higher in annual forecasts than in shorter period change forecasts as reported by Ash et al. (1998) and Stekler (1994) . This is in agreement with (British) evidence in Barker (1985) that forecasters with a longer perspective were more successful than those working with quarterly data.
(9) Although errors were too large, growth forecast accuracy could not have been substantially improved without improvement in the accuracy of the statistics. This also applies to a lesser extent to inflation forecasts.
As stated above, one of the most interesting results from this study is that inflation forecasts are better than growth forecasts. According to Exhibit 1b, inflation is falling and there has been a decline in the inflation variance over time (although not uniform). Inflation revisions are smaller than those for growth figures. Taken together, these results support stabilisation policies based on inflation targeting, instead of Keynesian fine-tuning of output, which was a policy still being pursued by many European countries in the 1970s. Economic policy requires accuracy in both statistics and in forecasts. The latter depends on the former, and it seems that we cannot achieve decisively better forecasts (and policy) without first improving the statistics, which today is possible through the use of modern data techniques to produce fast and highly accurate on-line statistics.
Appendix A 2) The OECD forecast for France was used as a substitute for a missing value 1983.
3) The inflation forecasts are made in July and February. Since the latter is closer to December it was chosen. 4) For 1982 the inflation forecast is missing. As a substitute, we used a quarterly forecast made in the fourth quarter of year t for the same quarter in t+1.
5) The GDP forecast for 1977 is missing. Only figures for 1980 onwards were used. 6) In 1975-1980, two alternative inflation forecasts were published. For 1976 and 1978-80 , the more likely one was indicated in the text and we chose that one. For the remaining years the forecast is the arithmetic average.
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Appendix B . The contingency table test of directional accuracy
The acceleration/deceleration forecasts were tested for information content using the 2×2 contingency 
where 
